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(2002) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1).
First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness
Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology
Dan Zahavi
pp. 7-26
The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.
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Full citation:
Zahavi, D. (2002). First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1), pp. 7-26.
