In many areas, phenomenology reminds science of what it is trying to explain. Moreover, it offers a method to investigate the explanandum itself, experience, that allows for the development of a good conceptual and descriptive understanding of what is to be explained. In this talk, it will be argued that phenomenology functions as a constraint on scientific explanations, meaning that science should always be informed by continued descriptions of its explanandum. For the purposes of this talk, I’ll make use of recent literature addressing the relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science (Pokropski 2022; Geniusas 2020; Fuchs 2017...etc.) and mobilize a case example, namely the mechanistic explanations of pain in neuroscience and their current limitations. It will be argued that these limitations are the result of a conceptual underdevelopment of the explanandum (the experience of pain) which determines the type of explanans available for these explanations.